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Criminal Law-Competence, Prejudice, and the Right to
"Effective" Assistance of Counsel
"When I use a word, " Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful
tone, 'it meansjust what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less. "
"The question is, " saidAlice, "whether you can make words mean
so many different things. "
"The question is," said Humpty Dumfpty, "Which is to be master-
that's all"
A criminal defendant enjoys not only a right to the assistance of counsel,2
but also a right to effective assistance.3 But what does sixth amendment "ef-
fectiveness" mean? Current understanding of the word focuses on "compe-
tence." For example, a trial lawyer who refuses to argue a particular defense
because he feels that it will create difficult problems has acted competently;
however, a trial lawyer who refuses to argue a particular defense because he
has made no pre-trial investigation of its pertinence has acted incompetently.4
Unfortunately, this definition doesn't go far enough--current understanding
should consider "prejudice" as well as "competence." Because of the recent
relaxation of the automatic reversal rule, a court will condemn only incompe-
1. L. Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, in The Complete Works of Lewis Carroll 214
(Mod. Lib. ed. 1936).
2. The Supreme Court recognized a federal defendant's right to assistance of counsel in
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938); however, the Court did not recognize a state defend-
ant's right to assistance of counsel until Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963), in which
the Court overruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942).
3.. The Court first recognized the "effectiveness" requirement in Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932). The case gained national attention when juries condemned the "Scottsboro boys,"
a group of illiterate black youths accused of the rape of two white girls, to death. The Supreme
Court found a violation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause, because the state trial
court's appointment of "all the members of the bar" did not result in an "effective" appointment
of counsel. Id. at 56, 71.
In two cases decided in the early forties, the Supreme Court established the following rule: if
the defendant enjoys a right to assistance of counsel, then the Constitution guarantees him a right
to "effective" assistance. The first case, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), reversed the
conviction of a federal defendant, based on the violation of an "effectiveness" requirement de-
rived directly from the sixth amendment "assistance" requirement. Id. at 76. The other case,
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), refused to reverse the conviction of a state defendant, because
the sixth amendment "assistance" requirement did not apply to the states. Id. at 471. Neverthe-
less, the decision reaffirmed Powell, which did reverse a state defendant's conviction by deriving
the "effectiveness" requirement from the fourteenth amendment due process clause when a state
statute provided the "assistance" requirement. Id. at 463-64. Thus, the Court simultaneously im-
plied "effectiveness" from the sixth amendment and from the fourteenth amendment.
When Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), finally overruled Betts to extend the sixth
amendment "assistance" requirement to the states, the due process source of "effectiveness" disap-
peared. Consequently, both state and federal defendants now enjoy a sixth amendment right to
"assistance" and a sixth amendment right to "effectiveness."
4. The courts usually distinguish between trial performance and trial preparation according
to the principle of "informed, professional deliberation." E.g., United States v. Hinton, 631 F.2d
769, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978)). When counsel has investigated tactical alternatives prior to trial,
his conduct during the trial evidences tactical decisions which no judge will condemn because of
judicial reluctance to second-guess the defense. See, e.g., Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
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tence prejudicial to the defense.5 Either the defendant or the government
must show that the trial lawyer's representation prejudiced or did not
prejudice the trial result. 6 Thus, the real meaning of "effectiveness" depends
upon the interaction of "competence" and "prejudice." A provocative line of
cases in the District of Columbia Circuit-a line culminating in the reasoning
originally asserted by the Fourth Circuit7-illustrates this interaction.8
In Diggs v. Welch 9 the court used a "farce and mockery" test'0 to measure
"effectiveness": the 1945 opinion refused to reverse defendant's conviction be-
cause counsel's advice to plead guilty to a lesser offense did not render the trial
a sham." This test equated competence with prejudice. After all, the defend-
5. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). See note 6 infra.
6. Of course, the threshold question is whether a court should reverse automatically after
the defendant demonstrates a violation of his constitutional rights. Prior to 1967 the Supreme
Court repeatedly reversed constitutional error without discussing prejudice. The sole exception,
Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900), held that defendants sixth amendment right to con-
front witnesses against him did not prejudice the defense because defendant admitted his guilt.
Note, Harmless Error: The Need for a Uniform Standard, 53 St. John's L. Rev. 541, 544 & nn.17
& 18, 545 & nn.19 & 20 (1979).
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), relaxed the constitutional error per se rule. This
decision stated that violation of some constitutional rights would still result in reversal without
discussion of prejudice, but that violation of other constitutional rights would now result in rever-
sal oly after a fin jdice. Id. at 22. This pivotal case provided no test for distinguish-
ing between the two classes oights. But see id. at 52 n.7 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Apparently, the
Supreme Court preferred a case-by-case approach to the problem. Consequently, other courts
may construe the decision to mean that some "effectiveness" cases always command reversal, but
that other "effectiveness" cases only merit reversal after a determination of prejudice.
A primary decision to forego summary reversal of constitutional error leads to a secondary
decision concerning the allocation of the burden of proving prejudice. In other words, if the
courts decide to reject automatic reversal, then the courts must decide who must show prejudice or
the lack of prejudice. Chapman reserved this decision for federal law and placed the burden on
the government to show beyond a reasonable doubt that constitutional error did not affect the
verdict. Id. at 21, 24. Nevertheless, a later case, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), placed
the burden squarely on the defendant. Id. at 112. Thus, under the post-Chapman "effectiveness"
cases, any of three possible scenarios might necessitate reversal: the defendant's simple showing
of counsel's incompetence; the defendant's proof of counsel's incompetence and the government's
failure to prove lack of prejudice; the defendant's proof of both incompetence and prejudice.
7. E.g., Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011
(1978); Jackson v. Cox, 435 F.2d 1089 (4th Cir. 1970); Coles v. Payton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). See note 4 and accompanying text supra; notes 17, 18, 33,
40, 45, 56 and accompanying text infra.
8. Because "effectiveness" cases present unique factual problems, the courts could have
adopted an ad hoe approach to their solution. See United States v. Wood, 628 F.2d 554, 556-57
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (courts may distinguish "effectiveness" cases on their facts). Instead, the courts
chose to develop standards applicable to all such cases. See, e.g., id. at 559 (defendant must prove
"serious incompetency" plus prejudice). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has not only figured prominently in this evolution of "effectiveness," but also
has produced the most volatile arguments concerning the course of this evolution.
9. 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
10. Id. at 670. The test quickly gained nearly universal acceptance. All of the circuits except
the Fifth Circuit established a "farce and mockery" standard; the Fifth Circuit itself underwent a
period of substantial confusion because one opinion applauded the "farce and mockery" test.
Compare MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960) (effectiveness measured by "rea-
sonable" competence standard), with Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965) (effec-
tiveness measured by "farce and mockery" standard).
11. 148 F.2d at 668. The fair trial basis of the "farce and mockery" test reflected the court's
belief that "effectiveness" derived its constitutional legitimacy from the fifth amendment due pro-
cess clause rather than from the sixth amendment assistance clause. Id. at 668-69. Had the court
taken the opposite tack, "prejudice" would never have figured in the definition of "effectiveness."
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ant's demonstration that defense counsel's representation robbed him of a fair
trial subsumed a showing that counsel's representation adversely affected the
outcome of that trial. Consequently, a violation of the constitutional "effec-
tiveness" requirement meant more than "incompetent" representation, it
meant "prejudicially incompetent" representation. Presumably, the court tol-
erated "non-prejudicially incompetent" representation whenever the defend-
ant failed to carry the burden of proving prejudice.
More than twenty years later, Bruce v. United States12 described "farce
and mockery" as a metaphor for the "gross incompetence" which "blotted out
the essence of a substantial defense."13 Although this language teased compe-
tence apart from prejudice, the opinion actually changed the test of "effective-
ness" very little. Defendant, who argued that counsel erroneously induced
defendant's guilty plea, still had to prove prejudice in order to prove
incompetence. 14
The court abandoned "farce and mockery" completely in United States v.
DeCoster (DeCoster I).Is The 1973 decision noted the following blunders by
counsel: failure to interview the robbery victim, the codefendants, and the
arresting officers; failure to request a jury trial when the same judge who heard
codefendants' guilty pleas sat on defendant's case; and failure to realize that
the only alibi witness produced by the defense would place defendant at the
scene of the crime.16 The appellate panel asked the government to show "lack
of prejudice"17 after defendant proved a "substantial" violation of a particular
After all, a Supreme Court case decided three years earlier plainly stated that a federal defend-
ant's "right to have the effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment,... is
too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of
prejudice arising from its denial." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942). By adopting a
fair trial test, the circuit court dealt with the impact of counsers conduct on the verdict-i.e., with
the prejudicial effect of counsers incompetence. Although Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d
787, 789-93 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958), later recognized the sixth amendment as
the proper source of "effectiveness," the decision retained the established "farce and mockery"
test.
Indeed, some judges recently revived the due process notion of "effectiveness." They saw a
"continuum" stretching from sixth amendment cases like Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335(1963) (state impairment of trial representation), to fifth amendment cases like United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (counsel's own incompetence). See United States v. DeCoster
(DeCoster I1), 624 F.2d 196, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc). The court in DeCoster I found
that under the principles established by Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), Gideon-type
cases deserved automatic reversal, or disproof of prejudice by the government; Agurs-type cases
required proof of prejudice by the defendant. 624 F.2d at 201-03. But this argument contained
two serious flaws. On one end of the "continuum," the judges confused sixth amendment "assist-
ance" with sixth amendment "effectiveness." Compare Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342, with Glasser, 315
U.S. at 76. On the other end, they employed a due process case that explicitly avoided the "effec-
tiveness" issue. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112 n,20. Thus, the continuum spread itself too widely.
12. 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
13. Id. at 116-17.
14. Id. at 116.
15. 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973). (The reporters vary in the spelling of defendant's name;
in this Note it will appear "DeCoster.")
16. Id. at 1200-01.
17. Id. at 1204 (quoting Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
849 (1968)).
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"duty" owed by "reasonably competent" counsel,18 and remanded to the dis-
trict court for a supplemental hearing on counsel's performance.' 9 Subse-
quently, DeCoster 1120 reversed defendant's conviction. Together, these two
decisions established a tougher test of "effectiveness." '21
Reacting to the panel's opinions in DeCoster I and II, the District of
Columbia Circuit met en bane to decide DeCoster 111.22 With the panel in
dissent, the court changed the competency test to "serious incompetency," 23
and placed the burden on defendant to prove "likely prejudice," and only then
on the government to disprove "actual prejudice." 24 This plurality opinion
actually revived Bruce. "Serious incompetency" differed only slightly from
"gross incompetence." 25 Similarly, the "likely prejudice" standard restored
defendant's burden of proving that counsel's conduct "blotted out the essence
of a substantial defense."26 As a result, "actual prejudice" had only formal
significance. Once again, the defendant had to prove prejudice in order to
prove incompetence.
The DeCoster I and II panel acted promptly to counter the repercussive
DeCoster III decision.27 In United States v. Wood,28 the panel argued that a
majority of the en bane court, through four of the five opinions, 29 had actually
adopted a "reasonable competence" test.30 And in United States v. Hinton,31
Judge Bazelon,32 the author of the first two DeCoster opinions, rewrote the
18. Id. at 1202-04. The opinion suggested the ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution
Function and the Defense Function (Approved Draft 1971) as a general source for the duties
which the trial courts should develop on a case-by-case basis. 487 F.2d at 1203 & n.23. Compare
the ABA Standards with the list of duties in Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert,
denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
19. DeCoster 1, 487 F.2d at 1201.
20. United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster II), No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., decided Oct. 19, 1976),
appended to United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster III) 624 F.2d 196, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en
banc).
21. See generally Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cinn. L. Rev. I
(1973).
22. United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster I1), 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc).
23. Id. at 206 (quoting Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96, 315 N.E.2d 878, 883
(1974)).
24. Id. at 206 & n.64, 208, and id. at 245 (Robinson, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 206. The court described this slight change as a "refinement." Id.
26. Id. at 206 n.64. The court expressly equated the two phrases. Id.
27. The DeCoster I and !! panel consisted of three judges. Chief Judge Bazelon and Judge
Wright formed the majority. Judge MacKinnon concurred in part and dissented in part.
28. 628 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (counsel failed to interview witnesses before trial,
failed to understand the legal principles involved in the insanity defense, and failed to seek a
continuance when the court disqualified the only favorable expert witness).
29. DeCoster III, 624 F.2d at 222 (MacKinnon, J., concurring opinion); id. at 248 (Robinson,
J., concurring opinion); id. at 267 (Bazelon,, J., dissenting opinion); id. at 300 (Wright, C. J.,
dissenting opinion).
30. United States v. Wood, 628 F.2d at 569-70 & n.57 (Bazelon, J., concurring and dissent-
ing); Id at 561 & n.5 (Robinson, J., concurring and dissenting). 1
31. 631 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (counsel failed to request a recess when the Government's
disclosure of witnesses' statements overwhelmed the defense).
32. Judge Bazelon has spent more than thirty years on the District of Columbia Circuit,
fifteen as Chief Judge. His service there has marked him as a man of courage, compassion, and
creativity. He now holds the semi-retired status of a senior judge. Wash. Post, Mar. 30, 1978, § A,
at 22, col. I.
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"likely prejudice" "actual prejudice" formula. He interpreted "likely
prejudice" as a "likelihood," inviting the presumption of prejudice from de-
fendant's proof of counsel's incompetence;3 3 and he interpreted "actual
prejudice" as governmental demonstration "beyond a reasonable doubt that
. ..[counsel's] deficiencies... [constituted] harmless [error]," returning the
real burden to the government. 3 4 Together, Wood and Hinton reestablished
the progressive DeCoster I and II test of "effectiveness. '35
By adopting the "reasonable competence" language, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit has joined the growing majority of appellate courts. 36 Ten of
the eleven circuits have abandoned the once universal "farce and mockery"
test,37 and nine of which 38 have adopted either a "reasonable competence"
test,39 or a "normal competence" test,4° or both.4 1 This reform movement42
33. United States v. Hinton, 631 F.2d 769, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The DeCoster II opinion
noted that counsel's "substantial" violation of his duties created a presumption of prejudice.
DeCoster II, 624 F.2d at 309 & n.32. The court borrowed the presumption from the Fourth Cir-
cuit. Compare Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968)
(prejudice presumed from proof of any violation), with Jackson v. Cox, 435 F.2d 1089, 1093 (4th
Cir. 1970) (no presumption of prejudice from insubstantial violation).
34. United States v. Hinton, 631 F.2d at 783.
35. Hinton reestablished "reasonable competence" plus proof of "lack of prejudice" by the
government. Id. at 780 & n.31, 783.
36. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), in which the Court adopted a
"reasonably competent" test, described as assistance "within the range of competence demanded
of attorneys in criminal cases." Id. at 770, 771. But the opinion also recognized the discretionary
power of trial judges "to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys. . . representing
[criminal] defendants... in their courts." Id. at 771.
37. Only the Second Circuit clings to this standard. United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872 (1977) (counsel's decision to forego insanity defense in favor of
courtroom portrayal of defendant as persecuted religious psychic did not constitute ineffective
assistance).
North Carolina retains the "farce and mockery" test. State v. Sneed, 284 N.C. 606, 201
S.E.2d 867 (1974).
38. The Seventh Circuit measures competency under a "minimum standard of professional
representation." William v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975)
(counsel's failure to interview codefendant who would have exculpated defendant constituted in-
effective assistance).
39. See United States v. Hinton, 631 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980) (effective assistance found without discussion of
facts); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979) (coun-
sel's failure to anticipate future holdings in the criminal law concerning warrants, interrogation,
and identification did not constitute ineffective assistance); Reynolds v. Mabry, 574 F.2d 978 (8th
Cir. 1978) (counsel's failure to investigate circumstances of defendant's arrest based upon his deci-
sion that only an insanity defense would exculpate defendant did not constitute ineffective assist-
ance); Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974) (counsel's failure to advise defendant of
elements of robbery, including intent to permanently appropriate property, constituted ineffective
assistance); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974) (counsel's failure to call a police
expert who would have rebutted the government's crucial identification evidence constituted inef-
fective assistance).
40. See Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011
(1978) (counsel's failure to make a motion to exclude the jury while the court dismissed the first
rape indictment, and counsel's decision to forego his peremptory challenges in the second rape
indictment, constituted ineffective assistance); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970)
(counsel's failure to impeach two witnesses' courtroom identifications of defendant when the wit-
nesses could not identify him at the line-up, and to impeach another witness' courtroom identifica-
tion when the witness identified him only after the FBI pointed him out, warranted evidentiary
hearing on ineffective assistance).
41. See United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir. 1978) (counsers unnecessary introduc-
1981]
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seeks to rid the criminal courts of incompetent defense attorneys. 43 Young
lawyers often begin their careers representing criminal defendants;44 other
more experienced lawyers take dozens of cases at a time;45 a few lawyers sim-
ply lack the ability to present a proper defense.46 Meanwhile, the civil courts
have protected these defense attorneys from private actions brought by dissat-
isfied defendants, 47 and the professional bar has proven unwilling to entertain
disciplinary proceedings against them.48 Consequently, the reform of coun-
tion of defendant's prior convictions into a trial in which defendant did not testify constituted
ineffective assistance).
The different labels attached to this strict competency test have caused some confusion over
whether "reasonable" implies something different than "normal." After all, substitution of the
word "reasonable" in place of the word 'normal ' suggests that the court has avoided a malprac-
tice standard. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A (1965) ("skill and knowledge nor-
mally possessed by members of that profession"). Actually, the Supreme Court in McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), described "reasonable" competence by alluding to the "range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id at 770-71.
42. The reform of the competency test left a couple of unanswered questions in the courts of
appeals. Both problems threatened to develop "reasonable" competency into a double standard.
The courts resolved most of the arguments in favor of a single constitutional standard.
Although McMann adopted the "reasonably competent" test in a habeas corpus case, some
doubt lingered as to whether defendant should show a greater violation of effective assistance in
collateral attack than on direct appeal. See, e.g., Garton v. Swenson, 497 F.2d 1137, 1139 n.4 (8th
Cir. 1974). Recent cases have not pursued this distinction. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Mabry, 574 F.2d
978 (8th Cir. 1978). Nevertheless, the distinction survives in joint representation cases. Compare
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (direct attack: defendant need not show that a conflict
of interest actually affected counsel's representation), with Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980)
(collateral attack: defendant must show that a conflict of interest actually affected counsel's repre-
sentation).
The distinction between the competency of court-appointed counsel and the competency of
privately-retained counsel also created some confusion. For example, the Second Circuit used an
agency theory to justify its refusal to determine the effective assistance issue when the defendant
selected the attorney himself. United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 872 (1977). And the Fifth Circuit used a state action theory to justify the use of a less strict
standard of competency when the defendant chose his own attorney. Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505
F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975). However, the Supreme Court re-
cently destroyed this appointed versus retained counsel dichotomy, stating that a "proper respect
for the Sixth Amendment" requires that "the often uninformed decision to retain a particular
lawyer" should not reduce a defendant's constitutional protection, and that "conduct of a criminal
trial itself implicates the State in the defendant's conviction." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,
344 (1980).
43. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 21; Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Crimi-
nal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 Va. L. Rev. 927 (1973); Waltz, Inadequacy of
Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw.
L. Rev. 289 (1964).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963) (counsel corroborated
defendant's contention that counsel's inexperience evoked an improper guilty plea).
45. See, e.g., Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968) (court-
appointed public defender, burdened with a heavy schedule, failed to prepare adequately for
trial).
46. See, e.g., DeCoster III, 624 F.2d at 264 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (counsers numerous er-
rors described as "slovenly, indifferent representation").
47. The few malpractice cases litigated have all resulted in victory for counsel. Kaus & Mal-
len, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel-Reflections on "Criminal Malpractice," 21 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 1191, 1192 (1974). And actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against court-appointed lawyers have
also failed. Gozansky & Kertz, Private Lawyers' Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 24 Emory L.J.
959, 969 (1975).
48. Although client complaints usually concern incompetence, bar disciplinary committees
prefer to limit their proceedings to moral misconduct. Marks & Cathcart, Discipline within the
Legal Profession: Is it Self-Regulation? 1974 U. Ill L.F. 193, 225.
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sel's competence has fallen upon the criminal courts themselves. "Reasonable
competence" represents their response.
This language merits comparison with other well-known measures of
counsel's conduct. According to the ABA Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, a "lawyer should represent a client competently." 49 Unfortunately, a con-
stitutional competency test based on the Code's general statement would not
provide a judge with any guidelines for the defense of criminal cases. 50 The
ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Func-
tion remedy this problem with a list of duties owed by counsel; for example,
client conferences, pre-trial motions, and preparatory investigations.51 But a
constitutional test based on the Standards' specific duties would thrust a judge
into an active role in the defense of criminal cases. 52 Finally, a tort standard
of counsel's conduct exists: a reasonably prudent lawyer should possess the
care, skill, and knowledge attributed to members of the profession similarly
situated.53 Although "reasonable competence" comes very close to this ap-
proach, no circuit has actually adopted a tort standard.54 Perhaps the courts'
caution stems from a desire to avoid retrial for mere negligence. 55 At any rate,
"reasonable competence" demonstrates the judges' determination to improve
the performance of attorneys representing criminal defendants in their courts.
Although the District of Columbia Circuit has adopted the majority posi-
tion on competence, that court has adopted the minority position on
prejudice--only one other circuit places the burden on the government rather
than on the defendant.56 The disagreement indicates different responses to the
fact that counsel's failure to prepare for trial rarely makes its way into the trial
record. Neither the defendant nor the government can easily show that some
act which never took place prejudiced or did not prejudice the verdict. Conse-
quently, most of the circuits believe that the absence of a written record invites
a "disappointed prisoner" to use his "imagination" to create an "opportunity
to try his former lawyer." 57 However, the District of Columbia Circuit has
expressed the view that actual prejudice may well escape the record as an inev-
49. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 6 (1980).
50. Most discussions of professional ethics presuppose a lawyer's competence. E.g., G. Haz-
ard, Ethics in the Practice of Law 20 (1978).
51. ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function §§ 3.2,
3.6(a), 4.1 (Approved Draft, 1971).
52. See, e.g., DeCoster 111, 624 F.2d at 208 ("[a categorical approach] would open the door to
a fundamental reordering of the adversary system into a system more inquisitorial in nature").
53. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 32, at 161-63 (4th ed. 1971).
54. The two circuits which adopted the "normal competence" test came closer to a tort stan-
dard than the other circuits, comparing their approach to a professional standard of care. Mar-
zullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 544 n.9 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); Moore
v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 & n.27 (3d Cir. 1970). See notes 39-40 and accompanying text
supra.
55. Bines, supra note 43, at 943-44.
56. See Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224,226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968) (coun-
sel failed to interview the rape victim, her male companion, and a disinterested witness; failed to
advise defendant of the elements of the crime, including penetration; and failed to discover the
victim's medical report showing the absence of spermatozoa).
57. See, e.g., Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
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itable result of counsel's incompetence.58 By promoting the goal of improved
trial representation, the minority position actually takes the better view. A
brief return to the interaction of competence and prejudice demonstrates just
how governmental disproof of prejudice helps to increase a trial lawyer's
"effectiveness."
If counsel's performance passes muster under the "reasonable compe-
tence" standard, then the defendant has received "effective" assistance; if
counsel's performance has not passed muster, and if that performance has
prejudiced the verdict, then the defendant has received "ineffective" assist-
ance. But between these two extremes lies a void where the defendant receives
"not ineffective" assistance of counsel.59 Here, the defendant has not received
"effective" assistance, because he has not received reasonably competent rep-
resentation; however, the defendant has not received "ineffective" assistance,
because counsel's incompetence has not prejudiced the guilty verdict.
The creatures of this void, the "not ineffective" trial lawyers, avoid detec-
tion when courts allocate proof of prejudice to the defendant. They risk detec-
tion when courts allocate disproof of prejudice to the government. Consider
what happens when the defendant must show prejudice. By assuming without
deciding that counsel's conduct violated the "reasonable competence" stan-
dard, the courts can proceed directly to the issue of prejudice, dispensing with
the issue of competence altogether.60 Consequently, a slovenly trial attorney
has no reason to improve his incompetent representation as long as that repre-
sentation does not deteriorate to the point of prejudicing the verdict. But con-
sider what happens when the government must show the lack of prejudice.
This burden does not arise until the defendant has clearly established coun-
sel's violation of the "reasonable competence" standard. Consequently, a
slovenly trial attorney must improve his incompetent representation in order
to escape public condemnation, regardless of whether that representation
prejudiced the verdict. In short, the defendant's assumption of the burden of
proving prejudice hurdles the competency test, while the government's as-
sumption of the burden of disproving prejudice saves the competency test.
"Reasonable competence" plus governmental proof of "lack of prejudice"
should vastly improve criminal trial representation. 61 Nevertheless, this
double-barreled approach cannot completely solve the problem: mere negli-
gence may escape the competency test, and disproof of prejudice by the gov-
ernment may falsely exonerate a poor performance. The best possible
meaning of sixth amendment "effectiveness" ultimately depends on those con-
58. DeCoster 1, 487 F.2d at 1204.
59. Gregory Bateson has demonstrated the significance of the double negative in psychology,
anthropology, and biology. G. Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (1972).
60. See United States v. Wood, 628 F.2d 554, 559-60 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (the appellate
court did not reach the issue of counsel's incompetence, because that court felt that no prejudice
resulted from counsers conduct assuming such incompetence).
61. See United States v. Hinton, 631 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The Hinton decision does not
signal the end of the "effectiveness" controversy, given the differences which divide the court.
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scientious trial attorneys who truly want to "master" their profession.62
WILLIAM MCBLIEF
62. L. Carroll, supra note I. Of course, this "looking glass" appeal to professionalism ad-
dresses Holmes' "good [man]... who finds his reasons for conduct... in the... sanctions of
conscience," rather than Holmes' proverbial "bad man.., who cares only for the. . . knowledge
*.. of what courts will db in fact." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457,459, 461
(1897).
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